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INTRODUCTION
In recent years one of the most striking
aspects of government at all levels has been the growth
of administrative tribunals. With the increasing com-
plexity of social relationships in the past century, it
has been found necessary for government to expand its
activity into new fields. Since it early became appar-
ent that legislation could not be framed so as to cover
all contingencies in even one phase of our involved
life, it was found necessary to frame laws of broad
scope. The burden of filling in the details and the
adaptation to changing conditions was left to the
administrative group. Since many questions of fact
would arise of a nature to require decisions, it
was found necessary to set up semi-judicial bodies
thus avoiding a crowding of the courts. These judicial
functions were also left to the administrative group.
There remained, however, the legislature and courts to
see that these administrative groups did not get out
of hand.
Among the groups so formed is the Zoning
Board of Appeals which has powers over the application
of the Zoning Ordinance or By-law in many communities
in this country. Such boards have powers of both
judicial and legislative character. They have specific
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limitations in the exercise of these powers, and it
is hoped that by this analysis of the work of two of
them we can appraise their records and make recommenda-
tions to improve their operation.
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CHAPTER I
BACKGROUND OF ZONING AND THE BOARD OF APPEALS.
1. Zoning History
Zoning is the outgrowth of the heterogeneous
development of communities during the nineteenth century,
and has as its purpose the avoidance of such conditions
in the future. It became apparent in the early years of
this century that there were measurable losses in the
completely uncontrolled use of land and buildings.
These losses were found to be in fields of health,
safety and general welfare, which includes almost all
aspects of physical, social and economic well being of
the community.
One effort to overcome these deficiencies in
growth was made in Boston, Mass., early in this century
when a statute was passed limiting the heights of build-
ings in different areas of the city with different
heights in different areas. About the same time the
city of Los Angeles, California passed regulations
concerning the use of land and buildings. In cases
contesting the validity of these rules they were
sustained. While these were but partial zoning
1. Welch v. Swasey, 193 Mass. 364, 214 U.S. 91.
Ex parte Quong Wo, 161 Cal. 220.
Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 165 Cal. 416, 239 U.S. 394.
regulations, New York City followed some ten years
later and passed a comprehensive ordinance which
covered all the major features now found in zoning
ordinances. This occured in 1916 and has been followed
by several hundred comparable ordinances and by-laws in
about every state of the union. In spite of these early
decisions there remained a slight cloud over the
constitutionality of the zoning process which was not
removed until the case of Village of Euclid (Ohio) v.
Ambler Realty Company, 272 U. S. 365 in 1926 which
sustained the validity of the principal of zoning with
sufficient clarity to prevent further litigation on that
phase of the problem.
2. Zoning Procedures.
Zoning attempts to guide the various activities
of community life into the most logical channels in re-
lation to probable natural development. The theory is
that each land use activity will do best for itself and
for the community in an area unmarred by interference
from other uses with which it does not get along. In
actuality we know that residential neighborhoods,
physically, socially and economically, are better off if
not invaded by industry and business. Likewise there is
reason to believe that industry is better off if not
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interspersed with scattered residential uses. From
another angle we know that certain uses will tend to
follow certain natural conditions. By its very nature
shipping must be associated with water frontage, and
railroads. We could go on indefinitely like this but
we are not expounding the practices of zoning. Suffice
it to say that zoning is based on a study of these
principles and the application of them to an individual
community. The individual community becomes the second
major factor in zoning since any zoning plan must relate
to the community involved. The pure theory is of no use
if due to special conditions in the locality under study
growth has not even approximated the normal expectations.
Thus we find that any zoning plan is intimately wrapped
up with the past growth of the community.
From the studies prepared with the above
ideas in view the zoner arrives at a presumed pattern
of growth. This will consist of a certain proportion of
residence, of business, and of industry and areas for
the accomplishment of each function. These are not the
areas he finds so used today, although there should be
a vast preponderence of such conformance. Having thus
divided the community into areas of expectable use the
zoner will prepare regulations which describe in more
detail many much more minor aspects of the problem such
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as height, coverage, and exceptions, so as to have a
complete regulation of the buildings and their use,
the land and its use. When combined in a map and
printed matter, it will be passed by the local legis-
lature under some state enabling act and become the
law of the community.
3. Zoning Administration.
While this whole paper is to deal with this
subject a brief summary of the procedures involved in
enforcing a Zoning Ordinance should be made. The
ordinance will include one or two items that make it
mechanically enforceable, namely a building permit and
perhaps an occupancy permit. Under the regulations one
cannot build without a building permit and one cannot
occupy without an occupancy permit, and violations are
subject to fine. The person responsible for its en-
forcement is usually the building inspector. So far as
the mechanics are concerned, the prospective builder
will apply to the building inspector for a permit and
the inspector will review the use, location, and
description of the building to find out whether they
conform to the ordinance and if so will give the required
permit, assuming they conform to other regulations under
his control. This will occur in the vast number of cases
and in this paper we will have no further interest in
them.
4. Zoning Board of Appeals and its Powers.
Like all administrative officials the building
inspector can commit errors and may be unwilling to see
them. To protect the individual from such mistakes it
early became apparent that some opportunity for appeal
must be given and for this purpose a Board of Appeal was
created to review such mistakes. If the requesting party
feels that the inspector is in error in his interpretation
of the ordinance he may file an appeal. He is then given
a hearing to state his case and the board will pass judge-
ment on the matter. This process has served to keep the
inspector on the alert with the result that but few cases
of this sort arise.
There is another type of situation which may
arise, namely the special exception. Very often a
zoning ordinance will include a list of uses which the
board of appeal may permit if they find that it will not
harm the community. Common among such uses are hospitals,
cemeteries and other semi-public organizations. Upon
application to build a hospital for instance, the
inspector will refuse the permit but proceed to fill
out appeal or petition papers requesting a hearing which
will be given by the board. When all have had a chance
to be heard the board will decide whether this particular
hospital will be injurious to the community. As will be
shown later the extent of such special exceptions will
vary from community to community.
A third opportunity for appeals to the board
arose from an appreciation of the fact that an ordinance
no matter how well written could not meet all contingen-
cies, and that some method of ameliorating its harshness
would have to be developed. Accordingly the board of
appeal was given the power to grant variances from the
terms of an ordinance due to hardship. The exact word-
ing of this power varies from community to community
but not substantially.
These powers are clearly set forth in the
enabling act for Massachusetts, General Laws, Chapter
40, Section 30 as follows:
aThe board of appeal shall have the
following powers.
1. To hear and decide appeals taken as
provided in this smatlnnar in an ordinance or
by-law authorized under this section. 2
2. To hear and decide requests for
special permits upon which such board is
required to pass under such ordinance or by-law.
3. To authorize upon appeal, or upon
petition in cases where a particular use is
sought for which no permit is required, with
respect to a particular parcel of land a
2. This refers to administrative errors largely and the
rights of interested parties.
variance from the terms of such an ordinance
or by-law where, owing to conditions
especially affecting such parcel but not
affecting generally the zoning district in
which it is located, a literal enforcement
of the provisions of the ordinance or by-law
would involve substantial hardship to the
appellant, and where desirable relief may
be granted without substantial detriment to
the public good and without substantially
derogating from the intent or purpose of
such ordinance or by-law, but not otherwise."
There follow these paragraphs several specific ways in
which these powers may be exercised, but they are
administrative rather than judicial in nature, and
need not concern us here.
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CHAPTER II
PURPOSE AND METHOD
1. Purpose
In our introduction we briefly indicated what
purpose was in writing this paper, namely to appraise
the work of two boards of appeal and thereby develop
recommendations to improve the work. Some of the basic
concepts of zoning have been mentioned, an outline of
the administrative procedure has been discussed, and
the powers of the board of appeal have been cited from
the statute setting up the whole procedure. With these
ideas in our mind we can see that while the zoner
conceives a pattern for the city, the board of appeal
has the power over time to substantially distort that
pattern. The building inspector plays a rather sub-
sidiary part as a purely administrative party carrying
out the ideas of one or the other. Over time, therefore,
we may expect that a zoning ordinance will possibly be
destroyed by the activities of the board of appeal.
From this study we would like to discover
where the trouble lies. Perhaps we can see flaws in the
law, the ordinance or by-law, or the operation of the
board of appeal. 'Perhaps we will find flaws in all three.
The logical result can only be to recommend new
practices where necessary.
-11m
2. Method
Clearly the best way in which to judge the
operation of a zoning ordinance and board of appeals
is to sit in on all the hearings of a board over a
period of years with the intent to appraise their work
in the light of personal observation, preferably not
from the point of view of a member of a board, but
merely as a listener. But such a procedure is well
nigh impossible since it is necessary to cover several
years work in most communities in order to develop
enough information to complete such a study.
Lacking this chance, this paper is based on
a study solely of the records of the board as source
material. The procedure was simply to go thru the
records case by case and take off that data which
appeared to touch on the matter at hand. The material
was carried on cards and those desired for any special
phase of this work could be studied together. Also
statistical information could be gathered but that
was not a primary purpose here. Obviously it was
necessary to carefully review the General Laws, the
Ordinances or By-laws, and the court decisions on the
subject in order to determine the standards of
performance.
For localities in which to operate, two
-12-
divergent communities were chosen, Cambridge and
Concord, Massachusetts. On the one hand we find a
large well settled city of about 100,000 population,
a city with very mixed uses so far as Zoning is
concerned. On the other we find Concord to be a small
suburban community of 7,500, a town substantially
residential in character. The two sets of regulations
are equally divergent, one a modern three year old
ordinance prepared with a great deal of care, the
other 18 years old and distorted by frequent unplanned
amendments. The actual cases studied in Cambridge go
back to the beginning of the ordinance passed at the
end of 1943 to replace an obsolete one. The cases in
Concord go back to the beginning of the board of appeal
in 1935.
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CHAPTER III
THE RECORDS
Like all administrative boards, the board of
appeal is required to make a record of its actions. In
Section 30 of Chapter 40 we find these clear words.
"The board shall cause to be made a detailed
record of its proceedings, showing the vote
of each member upon each question, or, if
absent or failing to vote, indicating such
fact, and setting forth clearly the reason
or reasons for its decisions, and of its
other actions, . . . . ."
In spite of these definite regulations one of the most
difficult aspects of reviewing the work of a board of
appeals is the fact that the records are not clear.
There are two main sources of information to
which one can turn for an understanding of the cases
which come before a board. First comes the actual
minutes of a given hearing. These will vary in their
completeness depending on whether or not the case is
one of general interest. The more excitement caused by
a given appeal, the more people there are to be heard
and accordingly the more information is presented in the
minutes. In spite of the lengths to which many objectors
or proponents will talk on a given appeal, their almost
uniform lack of knowledge of the legal bases of their
objections makes their testimony often quite useless in
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the determination of the actual facts of the case. In
simple terms they dont like the idea that is urged,
so they object. It often will appear that they will
employ to represent them counsel, who himself knows
very little about the actual reasons for allowing an
appeal. By this we do not mean the parties or counsel
appellant have any peculiar knowledge of the situation.
On the contrary if they did we do not feel that in good
conscience they could submit a great number of the
appeals that are considered. The significance of this
ignorance will appear further on in this paper when we
are considering actual cases which appear to have no
legal basis.
The second source of information is the so-
called "Return" of the board, which is simply its
decision on a specific case. This will include a very
brief resume of the facts, the provision of the ordin-
ance or by-law in question, the parties who favored or
opposed, and the decision of the board and their reasons.
It is at this last point that there is a very strong
tendency for the boards to fail to conform to the statute,
ordinance or by-law. One might presume that from this
paper one could find sufficient information to review the
case. This is definitely not so. To bear out this point
there follows a copy of a return from Cambridge.
-15-
Case #1535
CITY OF CAMBRIDGE
BOARD OF APPEAL
Decision by the Board of Appeal on the
written appeal and petition of Selma Silverman to vary
the application of the Zoning Laws of the City of
Cambridge, in so far as they pertain to the premises
known as 30 Magazine Street, Cambridge, so as to
permit the construction of a two car garage closer
than the five feet to the rear and side lot lines.
The premises are located in a Residence C.l. District.
The pq> ers in this case are on file and are
numbered 1535 and are made a part of this record.
A written appeal was made upon refusal of
the Superintendent of Buildings to issue a permit on
the ground that this would violate Article 6, Section
4, Paragraph 3, of the Zoning Ordinance.
At the hearing held on Thursday, June 14,
1945, the Board heard the Petitioner.
The Board is familiar with the location of
the Appellant's property, the layout and other
characteristics, as well as the surrounding neighbor-
hood.
The Board makes the following Findings of
Fact:
The Board find that the circumstances peculiar
to this specific case justify a relaxation of the restric-
tions imposed by the said Zoning Laws and that the vary-
ing of the application of the same will not conflict with
the spirit of the law or will it injure any person or
property. Therefore, the Board, finds that this is a
specific case wherein enforcement of the law involves
practical difficulty and unnecessary hardship, and
wherein desirable relief may be granted without sub-
stantially derogating from the intent and purpose of
said Zoning Laws; hence, acting under its discretionary
power, The Board, parries the application of the same in
this specific case, annuls the refusal of the Superintend-
ent of the Building Department to issue a permit and
directs him to issue the permit.
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This is typical and shows the failure of the board to
conform to the above quoted portion of the statue. They
also serve to show the difficulty faced by anyone trying
to find out what motivates a board in a general way, more
or less as is being tried here, or in a specific sense
in an effort to find out what to expect in comparable
situations.
Not only is the statuteclear as to what is
wanted in the return, but the matter has been subject to
1
judicial determination in Massachusetts. In a case
involving many procedural matters the court made itself
very clear on this point also, as follows:
. . . . . there must be set forth in the
record substantial facts which rightly can
move an impartial mind, acting judicially
to the definite conclusion reached."
And further:
"They are not satisfied by a mere repitition
of the statutory words. Minute recitals may
not be necessary, but there must be a definite
statement of rational causes and motives,
founded upon adaquate findings."
These are outstandingly good statements on the part of
the court, for they say nothing that one would not expect
from reading the words of the statute, as quoted above;
"and setting forth clearly the reasons for its decisions,
* . . . ." This is definite contrast to the quoted
record from Cambridge which seems clearly to be " a mere
repitition of the statutory words."
1. Prusik v. Boston Board of Appeal. 262 Mass. 451 (1928)
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We here cite these aspects of the operations
of boards of appeal since we feel that the failure by
boards to conform to these written procedures results in
the errors that are committed in actual practice. In
our judgement it would appear that if the appeal boards
conformed with the procedures, they would require a
clearer understanding of their powers in appellant and
objector, and there would follow in the course of time
a clearer understanding of the whole matter on the part
of the public and future appellants. This would also
have its effect on the counsel who handle this type of
case. It may well be noted at this time that there
have been but few lawyers whose names have appeared
in the records of the Cambridge board, but these few
have appeared repeatedly. Lawyers are rarely called
on in Concord, a logical result of its less urban
character.
It is from these thoughts that our method of
studying the actions of these boards has arisen. The
statute prescribes very definite reasons for appeals.
It seems very logical that the boards should frame their
whole approach to each case within these rules. We are
going to analyse a great number of cases within the
statutory reasons with the judicial decisions to guide
us, hoping to thus find as far as possible where the
boards have succeeded or failed.
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CHAPTER IV
APPEALS STATISTICALLY
1. Cambridge Cases
It is at this point that we begin to see the
Iffect that differing ordinances have on the type of cases
handled by different boards of appeal. Reference was
earlier made to the three general groups of appeal of
petition that might be made, namely the appeal from ad-
ministrative errors, the special exception, and the
appeal because of a so-called hardship.
In Cambridge during the period under review
there were 114 cases that appeared in the files as having
come before the board, and of these 16 were withdrawn and
so no decision was rendered. The inadequacies of the
records play a part in the further subdivision of the
cases in that the board treats special exceptions in
the same manner as appeals. From the available data it
appears that there were no cases involving administrative
errors, about 12 involving special exceptions, and the
remaining 86 involving so-called hardship.
It appears further that 78 were granted and
only 20 denied, a very liberal approach. Dividing the
cases another way we find that 68 involved problems of
use of which 51 were granted and 17 denied, a considerably
less liberal attitude. The 30 remaining cases involved
-19-
generally the problem of coverage, including front and
rear yards and related provisions, and of these 27 were
granted and 3 denied. When we divided the cases between
special exception and variance, we find that the board
approved all 12 special exceptions and 66 out of the 86
variances.
A breakdown of the use variances by areas of
the city shows that no geographical area is peculiarly
subject to invasion, but that the so-called Residence C
districts are constantly being attacked. They consti-
tute the larger part of the city so the number of cases
arising in them are not excessively disproportionate to
their number. These invasions unfortunately are not
restricted to just one lower use such as local business,
but frequently extend to industry as well.
2. Concord Cases
The pattern of Concord cases is directly
derived from the by-law of that town. During the period
under review we find that the Concord Board has consider-
ed 94 cases but that 6 of these were withdrawn. Of the
remaining 88 cases, one appears to have involved an
administrative error, 69 involved special exceptions,
and the remaining 18 involved hardship.
The ratio of approvals approximates that of
-20-
Cambridge, since 71 were granted and only 17 denied.
When the cases are divided according to use or coverage,
we find that 63 out of 77 use appeals were granted and
that 8 out of 11 coverage appeals were granted. More
important in a way is the matter of the division by
variance as against special exception. Of the 18
variances 11 were granted and of the 69 special excep-
tions 59 were granted. It is interesting to note that
the Concord board with what will be shown to be much
more liberal powers in regard to special exceptions has
found it wise to deny at least some of them.
Geographical position and use district seem
also to have played little if any part in the appeals in
Concord. This is of course a result of the suburban-
rural aspect of the community and the fact that it is
largely zoned and use for single family residence.
3. The Reasons for the Differences.
The drastic difference between the type of
case handled by these two boards operating under the
same enabling act is of course the ordinance or by-law
under which they are operating. Both communities
provided for the normal processes of appeal as regards
hardship. There are a few phrases in the Cambridge
ordinance which might be construed to limit the variance
-21-
provisions of the statute, but since they do not as a
practical matter have any such affect we will not quote
them here.
When we consider special exception we find that
the regulations are as far apart as the poles. Cambridge
provides two brief opportunities for special exceptions.
The first involves problems where a zone line divides a
lot so that the larger part of the lot is in the less
restricted zone. Under these conditions the board may
permit the less restricted use to extend up to 25 feet
into the more restricted zone subject to such restric-
tions as it may impose after a public hearing. As a
practical matter no cases seem to have been argued on
this point although one much contested case seems to
have involved this very question. The other exception
is in behalf of non-conforming uses which may be allow-
ed to add up to 25% of its area and 50% of its assessed
valuation. This has not been cited but seems to have been
used a lot as will be pointed out later. Concord's by-
law is very different in that it appears to be almost a
bundle of special exceptions, so liberal in fact that
it takes careful study to find out what the board can-
not grant if they find that it is not or would not be
detrimental to the neighborhood. But more of this later.
This suffices to set forth the reasons for the vast
-22-
difference in the types of cases handled by the two
boards, and to show how the ordinance or by-law will
affect the work of a board.
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CHAPTER V
ADMINISTRATIVE ERRORS
1. The Significance of Administrative Errors.
In the previous chapter we covered the
statistical importance of administrative errors, and
found it to be negligible. This is a clear indication
that the terms of an ordinance or by-law can be learned
and understood and the map may be prepared in such a
form as to be not subject to error. The lone case which
arose in Concord involved the. determination of what is
a proper accessory use. A request for the use of quart-
ers in a dentist's residence for the practice of his
profession was refused and on appeal was allowed as a
normal accessory use. While classified as an adminis-
trative error it was a reasonable one in that the by-
law failed to more than state that accessory uses were
allowed without giving even an outline of what should
be considered as such a use.
A couple of other errors which might have come
in this category were treated in special ways so that
they did not fall into this statistical grouping. One
of these was a simple case of misreading the map, but
from an administrative point of view was dismissed
without decision upon discovery of the error. Another
-24-
case of trouble with the map occurred in Cambridge
where the zone division as scaled on the map was some
twenty feet within the property line of the last busi-
ness in a shopping district. When revisions were to be
made to that business it was ruled that the property
was partly in a residential zone, yet one could assume
that it would not be the intent of a zoner to thus cut
off his zone. Perhaps this would have been a case where
the building inspector could have assumed that the in-
tent was to follow the property line in view of the
facts of the situation. The board of appeal could not
see it this way either and ruled against the appellant.
2. The Building Inspector's Position
The above ideas lead us on to another
proposition, namely that the building inspector is in
a very strong position to assist in the operation of
the board. First by a full and clear understanding of
the contents and intent of the ordinance or by-law he
may be of great assistance to the prospective builder.
Further than that he should have a clear understanding
of zoning law and the power of the board under it.
Armed with such knowledge he would be in a real position
to advise on the advisability of appeals. He as well as
the board itself should be able to analyze a case and
-25-
find out the real basis of appeal. If he could do
this the bulk of the work of a board could be half
settled before the case comes up. As we develop our
ideas on the actions of the board we will be able to
see how the same approach would be of assistance to
both of them.
-26-
CHAPTER VI
SPECIAL EXCEPTIONS
1. Th Legal Status.
The statutory basis for special exceptions
was set out in an earlier chapter as well as a brief
note on their use. Further statutory limitations are
placed on the use of such provisions are in another part
of Section 30 of Chapter 40 as follows:
"Such ordinances or by-laws may provide that
the board may, in appropriate cases and subject
to appropriate conditions and safeguards, make
special exceptions to the terms of the ord-
inances or by-laws in harmony with their general
purpose and intent, and in accordance with
general or specific rules therein contained."
The application of this power has been very easy going
in most ordinances or by-laws that have found occasion
to include such provisions. The Cambridge ordinance is
very brief in this matter and for the so-called
"appropriate conditions and safeguardsn merely says that
the application of district regulations may be varied
"in harmony with their general intent and purpose."
This appears totally inadequate and if the Cambridge
board had found occasion to refer to and use this
portion of their ordinance there might have been occasion
for worry. The restrictions on the board in Concord are
placed in several sections of the by-law depending on
-27-
when they were passed by the town with the result that
they are not consistent in phraseology. We do, however,
find the following:
"substantially more detrimental to the neighborhood"
useriously detrimental or injurious"
"substantially increase an detrimental or
injurious effect
"detrimental or injurious"
"detrimental or injurious to the neighborhood
and will not substantially derogate from the
purpose of this By-law"
To somewhat soften the effects of such liberal guides to
the behavior of the boards in special exceptions we find
some detail restrictions on the excepted uses such as the
size of the signs that may show, the necessity of getting
the approval of a certain proportion of the neighbors.
It is striking that with all the possible pit-
falls presented by such provisions there is but little
actual litigation on the subject, if we are to accept
the writings of authorities in the field. The court in
Massachusetts has sustained such a provision when it
allowed a funeral parlor in a residence district. The
process may then be assumed to be valid, but at some
time we may expect to find further help on the extent to
which these provisions may be used.
Without the aid of cases in this jurisdiction
it will be well to refer to some basic legal matters.
1. Lambert v Lowell Board of Appeals, 295 Mass. 224 (1936)
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At some time the placing of a nearly uncontrolled
authority in the hands of an administrative body be-
comes the delegation of legislative powers. This is
always subject to legal criticism. It is clear that
the misuse of such powers would result in the gradual
removal of the effectiveness of the zoning regulations.
The formulation of a general rule to cover a whole
legal jurisdiction may be almost impossible, but for
local communities there may be a solution. If no
measure can be set up it may well be advisable not to
use the power. Perhaps in the coming review of the
types of cases that have arisen in Concord we will
find the broad outline of such a rule.
2. Cases Observed.
In contrast to our somewhat skeptical remarks
concerning the special exception up to this point, we
cannot find the erroneous cases that would truly de-
lineate the limits of the reasonable and unreasonable
in the cases in Concord. We may approach the answer
but on the whole the work of the board in Concord has
been so careful that the results are good in general.
As noted previously 59 out of 69 cases of this type were
granted in that town.
A typically harmless provision is that in the
Concord by-law which permits the board to allow the
-29-
conversion of single houses to double houses in the
single residence zones. This has been very extensive-
ly used in the past year during the housing emergency.
Further it is an extremely logical provision in a town
where there are a great number of large old houses which
are gradually becoming uneconomic and will only fall to
ruin if maintained in expensive single family use. But
even this liberality has not been unrestricted, for the
board has found occasion to limit the number of persons
which can occupy some of the converted residences. Thus
there may not ensue the crowded conditions which may
result from a conversion. This the board feels is a
way of preventing such a place being a detriment to the
neighborhood. Time limitations and limitations to the
present owners have been used also to assure the integ-
rity of their permits.
Another type of problem has been met in
Concord with the most liberal sort of provision in the
way of special exception that one could consider.
Section 6 (h) reads as follows:
"A permit to carry on in a general or single
residence district a profession or occupation
not classified as an accessory use customarily
incident to residential use or in a business
district a business not permitted by Sec. 3
of the Zoning by-law, may be issued by the
Building Inspector with the approval of the
Board of Appeals, if said Board, after notice
and a public hearing, shall be of the opinion
and shall find and rule that such use will not
430-
be detrimental or injurious to the neigh-
borhood and will not substantially derogate
from the purpose of the By-law; . . * . ."
Early in the days of the board of appeal of Concord
it was decided that certain uses were accessory uses.
Among those were doctors and dentists. Soon the
question of allied medical fields arose as well as the
doctor who wanted to have his space in someone else's
house so that that person could serve also as a sort
of secretary. All these matters have quite reasonably,
but under limited conditions been allowed in the
residential areas of the town. One of the chief factors
in these exceptions has been the almost total lack of
initial opposition, as well as lack of opposition at
later times when renewal hearings have been held.
Under a more specific exception tourist homes
have been allowed with strict limitations different in
each case, except that all have been for three year
periods. Detail controls included parking area and
size of signs. Again the opposition has not arisen
even after several years of activity. This is a way to
meet a need arising from the historical and educational
aspects of life in the town.
Permission has frequently been granted to
allow home industries under the above quoted Section
6 (h). Most of them were to be carried on in some
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already existing garage, and in every case with not
more than one helper. A single denial of a request of
this type occurred when someone wanted to store windows
in a single residence district. Denial here was due to
the noise that would accompany loading and unloading.
Again these have been renewed time after time without
complaint from anyone.
Provision for tea rooms, or gift shops to be
included in a private dwelling was made in a special
section of the by-law. A somewhat stricter attitude is
to be observed here, Withtwo out of four requests turned
down. Of these one was a case where someone bought
vacant land and wanted to build a house with tea room
and gift shop included. Although the by-law permits
such structures to be built, the board stated that it
would derogate from the intent of the by-laweee. It
may well be that it would be unwise to start building
such structures so we see the board using an increas-
ing degree of restraint.
Filling stations have been allowed along the
main highway under a special permit section requiring
approval of a certain proportion of the neighbors. The
board has seen fit to allow only a certain number of
such places on the basis that an excessive number will
be detrimental.
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The last substantial group of special
exceptions takes care of the removal of sand, gravel
and loam. The granting of these permits is made with
the possible requirement of a bond which has been enforc-
ed at times. This possibly is one group of powers that
has been unfortunately used. One of the pits now being
used is objected to regularly at every renewal hearing
by neighbors. This particular one makes one of the
main entrances to the town quite unattractive, and must
considerably reduce the value of land in that area.
3. The Standards to be used in Appraisal.
We have tried to skim over the types of cases
which bulk large in this work of the Concord board. We
have not discussed the activity of the Cambridge board
in this respect because there is no indication that they
have made any decisions under this provision although
certain of the cases seem to fall within the limits of
the special exception concerning the expansion of non-
conforming uses. Can we from the cases before us see a
way in which to set up.usable standards of conduct in the
processing of special exceptions.
It is almost absurd to say they must be reason-
able, for there are almost no bounds to that. "Detriment-
al to the neighborhood" is nearly a measurable thing in
-33-
that the neighborhood will respond if it is detri-
mental, and while the judgement of neighbors should
not be controlling it must be a powerful factor.
"Derogation from the intent of the by-lawn is a help
but it is almost impossible to determine what the
intent is. In a town such as Concord certainly noise
is a definite factor, and we find the board has so
found. Traffic disturbances should be kept at a
minimum and by limiting the size of some of the pro-
jects permitted under special exceptions the board
has effectively accomplished this. But certain
services are a necessity and benefit to the town and
by allowing doctor's offices at suitable places the
board has recognized that fact. So also with the
provision of filling stations they are allowing the
meeting of a need which willbring an economic benefit
to the town with negligible damage.
Mere words will not further describe the
limits which must be placed on a board to assure its
smooth handling of such cases. What has made these
permits largely sound is a quite clear understanding
of what the purpose of each special exception is and
a use of time restrictions to allow the board to remain
in control. If such a process is to be inculcated in
the minds of other boards it must not be done by further
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words of a descriptive nature but by directing their
attention to their work. Somehow each appeal must
involve a fuller statement of the case in relation to
each of the limiting factors of the by-law or ordinance.
We are here beginning to invade a territory
of study which can be better and more fully considered
with a study of the variance, so it is to that that we
will turn now.
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CHAPTER VII
VARIANCES
1. Variance Powers of Boards of Appeal.
In Chapter I a general discussion of the
powers of the board of appeal was presented. We have
now traversed the activities of our two boards in
relation to the first two powers and the time has come
to discuss the third. While in the statistics present-
ed in Chapter III it was shown that Concord used the
special exception to accomplish its decisions and
Cambridge used variances, we must point out here that
the latter is the more usual situation. Statistical
studies made in previous years in other communities
have indicated this. Therefore we are now approaching
the most vital part of this field.
First we will distinguish between the powers
held by the two boards under review. Both communities
are limited by the terms of Chapter 40, Section 30, of
the General Laws, parts of which were quoted in Chapter
I of this report. The only other factor involved in the
work of the Concord board is a section of the by-law
referring to the then existing powers as set forth in
Section 27A of the General Laws effective when the by-
law was passed which is as follows:
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" . . . . and subject always to the rule that
due consideration shall be given to conserving
the public health, safety, convenience, wel-
fare and property values.n
This phraseology does not seem to have affected the
thoughts of the Concord board as being any different
from the statutory provisions of Chapter 40, Section
30.
In Cambridge we find some further amplifica-
tion of the variance powers after an almost word for
word citation of the statute, as follows:
"Before any variance may be granted, it shall
be shown that special circumstances attach
to the property covered by the application
which do not generally apply to the other
property in the same district; that because
of said circumstances, property covered by
application is deprived of privileges possessed
by other properties in the same district and
that the granting of the variance is essential
to the enjoyment of a substantial property
right possessed by other properties in the
same district; and that granting the variance
will not result in material damage or prejudice
to other property in the same district and
vicinity.
If the Board of Appeal determines by a
concurring vote of all of its members that the
proposed variation relating to the use,
construction, or alteration of a building or
premises, or the use of the land can be granted
without impairing the general purpose or intent
of this ordinance, then the Board shall adopt a
motion embodying their findings in the above
mentioned specific points . . . . .n
It would appear that since the legislative body in
Cambridge decided that further qualifying phraseology
was needed that they meant to make certain that the
-37-
board used somewhat more rigorous standards than those
set forth on the statute. Clearly all these words
would be wasted to allow a less rigorous standard since
that is not within the power of the legislative body
under the enabling act. For the purposes of this paper
we will try to use as a standard the powers as set forth
in the statute and not dwell too much on the implications
of these extra words.
Reference to both this expanded phraseology
in the Cambridge ordinance and the specific words of
the enabling act brings out four main considerations
to be studied by a board in each case involving a
variance, We find special conditions, hardship, the
public good, and the intent of the ordinance or by-law.
The power to vary is dependant in every case upon the
impact of each of these factors on the facts of the
case. For instance we can say without question that
unless there are speciAl conditions affecting the
parcel involved there is no power to vary the applica-
tion of the ordinance. So also there must.be hardship,
but the amount is a matter of judgement in each case as
is the situation with the detriment to the public good
and the derogation from the intent of the ordinance.
In order to give the board some leeway in its actions,
the statute and ordinance use the word substantial to
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avoid a sort of veto condition which would arise in
every case were the words left unqualified.
This approach leads us to a method of analyz-
ing the cases which we have studied and the legal deci-
sions relating to the subject. We shall take each of
the above four subdivisions of the variance provision
and try to determine what the boards and courts have
considered as sufficient to permit a variance. In
reference to the court decisions it must be pointed out
that a court will try as a general rule to accept the
judgement of such a group as the board of appeals.
Further we must remember that the number of cases is at
best small due to the cost of litigation and the un-
willingness of individuals to undertake it. We are
therefore restricted from these angles and also because
the courts and boards have not precisely followed the
method of attack which we are using here.
2. What are Special Conditions.
The first thing to consider in the subject of
special conditions is to what they attach. The statute
makes this precise by referring to a parcel of land, it
says nothing of the owner of the land who may be appeal-
ing. The courts have found several occasions to make
this point quite clear and various authorities have done
the same.
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A leading case in Massachusetts, Norcross v.
Boston Board of Appeal, 255 Mass. 177 (1926) sustained
the granting of a variance for the land at the corner
of Arlington and Newbury Streets in Boston. It would
not seem that this decision would be repeated today.
The reasons which relate to special conditions were the
high value of the land, which value was largely depend-
ant on the type of structure that could be built on the
land, the extension of business in the region, which
affected all the lots near there, and the nearness to
a less restricted height district which also would seem
to have affected all the nearby lots. An often stated
qualification on the power to grant variances is that
they should not accomplish precisely what a change of
zone would accomplish. It would seem that this is
precisely what has occurred in this case. The court
here was not thoroughly convinced by the opinion of
the board, but stated that it could not be pronounced
erroneous as a matter of law.
In Hammond v. Springfield Board of Appeal,
257 Mass. 446 (1926) the special conditions affecting
the lot were a substantial number of non-conforming
uses surrounding the land in question. Similarly a
legal non-conforming use, that of a railroad yard, in
a residence district attached special conditions to the
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land so that it might be used for other business pur-
poses, under a ruling in Marinelli v. Boston Board of
Appeal, 275 Mass. 169 (1931).
In other cases mentioned in the authorities it
is not possible to determine whether the court quashed
the variance due to the lack of special conditions re-
gardless of hardship or because of insufficient hard-
ship. It appears that the court has not tried to make
a preliminary-and separate consideration of the matter
of special conditions, but has in most instances
considered the matter with a consideration of the
matter of hardship. This cannot be construed as the
result of a lack of potential cases on the matter of
special conditions for our review of the subject as
considered by the boards under study will show ample
opportunity for litigation.
In attacking the case histories we will cite
progressively cases from the correct to the doubtful
and on to the incorrect. In the first group we find
an appeal granted to build a garage in the front yard
in violation of the ordinance. The special conditions
which affected this lot were simply that there was 100
feet of front yard and almost no rear yard, the house
having been built long before automobiles or zoning
ordinances. This certainly was not a condition common
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to lots in the district since most of them were set but
20 feet from the street. In another instance we find
three connected houses, built before any zoning ordinance
in the city, situated on one lot of land of about 7000
square feet, only a little more than required for a
single house in that district. When the owner of all
three decided to sell separately a variance was needed.
This clearly was a special condition affecting this lot
and not generally the district inwhich it was located.
A different situation arises when a party wants
to divide an existing lot in a way not in conformity with
the ordinance. This may arise in a city such as Cambridge
where they are more or less regularly dividing up older
properties, but often preserving the old houses. Con-
formance with the ordinance will often not be possible
in respect to one of several lot requirements but will
exceeded in respect to others. In other instances con-
formance will result in injury to a large old house, or
an irregular lot. It would appear that in an instance
where to produce a logical lot for a large old house, it
was desired to reduce the area of a cut-off section of
the land, and where this new lot had excessive frontage
special conditions could properly be found to obtain.
Likewise, where the maintainance of the frontage rules
would have resulted in a cut off lot boundary passing
almost in front of the large remaining house, but where
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if a reduced frontage were allowed the new lot could be
made excessive in size special conditions could be found
to exist.
Topographical conditions may obviously be the
cause of special conditions and we find them recognized
as such in both communities. In one instancewhere a
lot backed up against a railroad cut and the ground in
the rear was very unstable, special conditions vere found.
Concord has recognized the same type of situation where
the land fell off rapidly toward the rear making the
construction of a garage nearly impossible. There can
be little doubt as to the right of such owners to claim
a hearing.
Another situation which has arisen several
times results from the effort of a homeowner who wishes
to improve his property, but finds that the proposed
work will be in violation of the ordinance. The fact
that a house was so situated on a lot that even a chim-
ney could not be added gives the basis for finding
special conditions. So also the boards have found that
where larger structures such as modern bathrooms or
kitchens were to be added, but would produce a violation,
there were special conditions.
A most difficult situation occurs when non-
conforming uses become involved. We have seen that the
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courts have recognized their significance. Even
stronger than the case cited in the previous section of
this chapter, Hammond v. Springfield Board of Appeal, is
the instance where an addition is to be made onto a non-
conforming use to expand or improve it. There would
seem to be little doubt left after the above cited case
that these were cases involving special conditions.
(See also Amero v. Gloucester Board of Appeal, 283 Mass.
45 (1933).
Another instance where there are clearly
special conditions affecting a lot is where a district
boundary passes thru a lot. This condition will occur
frequently where arbitrary dimensionsare used to define
the districts. Usually, however, the ordinance will
make specific provision for this case either by
definitely allowing the less restricted use to invade
the more restricted district for a defined distance as
in Concord, or providing for a special exception in
Cambridge. Where these established provisions are
found inadequate there would seem to be no reason for
not presuming special conditions. One of the most
extensively recorded cases in Cambridge involved a lot
divided into single, two and multi-family districts,
with a bit less than two thirds in the single family
district. There would seem to be no doubt but that
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there were reasons for considering the case of this
lot so far as special conditions were concerned.
The next condition we may consider is that
where the lot is the last one in a less restricted
district. This is a necessary result of any system of
drawing lines between permitted uses. There seem to be
three general situations in which this may arise, one
where a row of residence backs a row of business, another
where in a street front at some time the business ends
and the residence begins, and third when for some reason
there is an angle in the district line which leaves a
bit of residence jutting into business. The first in-
volves no special conditions because it is general to
the district. The second seems to involve special
conditions as does the third. Whether either of these
cases involves hardship is a matter which we will dis-
cuss later.
It seems that at this point that we have
reached the limit of special conditions and cases oited
from this point on will be to point out what should not
be considered as such. Among the approved appeals we
find one the Cambridge records is based on the follow-
ing facts. In a business A district which does not
permit an automobile parking lot there remains one
vacant bit of land. A shop across the street requests
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permission to use this lot for parking purposes.
Further facts are that the present owner does not want
to build at the present time but hopes to later. There
seems to be nothing in this case to make the lot un-
usual for in every district -we find vacant lots, and
the desires of the owner are not conditions affecting
the lot but conditions affecting his business operations.
This is a case where if this lot and presumably any other
vacant lot should be used for parking it is the respon-
sibility of the legislature to change the zoning map.
In another case a property was zoned for
residence B but at a later time was changed to Business
B, a change that was probably justified since it was on
a main artery and in an area not very attractive for
residence. The owner got an opportunity to use the
property for light industry and so appealed and the
appeal was granted. There are numerous lots in the
same category, which are being changed piecemeal to
the lower use. By the very act of repeatedly giving
variances in this area the board is giving clear proof
that the condition is one affecting generally the
district in which the property is situated. Comparable
to this is a case where a man will buy a house in a
residential district and immediately request a variance
to convert to a funeral home. The lot has been in each
-46-
case observed exactly like the next one to it and yet
the appeal is granted. This would appear to perhaps
be a case for a special exception since in fact it is
not a very injurious use.
Further citation of cases of this sort will
not assist us further in determining what we should
consider as special conditions. It might be well to
note that in our study we have found 34 of what appear
from the records to be this type of case. Of these
the board has found occasion in Cambridge to approve
22. We find no such cases in the Concord records.
From all these citations from the courts and
from the cases in two communities we must now draw a
more precise definition of what should be considered
as special conditions. To be useful it cannot be too
lengthy for then it becomes unreadable. Therefore we
propose the following:
Special conditions as set forth in the
statute means conditions of size, shape
or physical conformation of the single
parcel of land involved or the structures
upon it, their present use, or the use of
nearby parcels or structures.
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3. What is Hardship.
Hardship is a very indefinite and personal
term and it cannot be said that it is materially
clarified in the statute by requiring that it be sub-
stantial. The courts in Massachusetts have considered
some cases where the matter was pretty clearly before
their minds but they have seen fit to settle each case
on its own facts and avoided the promulgation of rule of
law on the subject. Since hardship is such a personal
matter and derives so certainly from the facts of the
case we agree in their policy thus far. From the great
number of cases we have reviewed, we intend to try and
narrow the uncertainty to at least some extent.
First we must consider what the courts have
said. In the Norcross case cited previously we noted
that the court felt that the reasons stated by the
board were not overpoweringly convincing but still were
not erroneous as a matter of law. This then set up a
borderline case and/is very important to that extent.
In the Hammond case they found that the inability to
rent based on the fact that there were a very sub-
stantial number of non-conforming uses within 350 feet
combined to produce a hardship warranting a variance.
In the Prusik case the fact of being adjacent to a
business zone and the owners understanding that the
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property was in a business zone did not combine
sufficiently to produce the substantial hardship called
for by the statute. (This case is not too clear cut in
that there were several other factors involved in the
litigation, almost any of which may have been the crucial
factor in the result.) In the Marinelli casethe fact
that unless the coal company, which was being forced out
of operation in one location due to the discontinuance
of railroad service was allowed to use the land in
question, which was in the same area of the city and
which it had agreed to buy or lease, it might be put
out of business entirelywas sufficient hardship to
warrant a variance. Coleman v. Boston Board of Appeal,
281 Mass. 112 (1932) presented a set of facts not
dissimilar from the Hammond Case. There were a consid-
erable number of non-conforming uses nearby, there was
a great volume of traffic on the street, and the owner
had been unable to rent his property. It was expected
that the completion of a subway extension nearly com-
pleted would increase the commercial aspects of the area.
The court, however, felt the situation was different.
This appears to be correct, for in the Coleman Case the
stores were all gathered together in one block across
a wide street, while in the Hammond Case they were
scattered generally about. The fact that there seemed
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to be a public convenience to be served seemed to add
enough to the situation in the case of Amero v.
Gloucester Board of Appeal, 283 Mass. 45, (1933) to
support a variance. In this case a man operated one gas
pump on leased land as a non-conforming use. He desired
to build a new pump on his own land which was adjacent,
at the time when two grades of gas became popular. Here
then the financial hardship was augmented by a benefit
to the community. The case of Phillips v. Springfield
Board of Appeal, 286 Mass. 469 (1934) clearly set forth
the principle that mere inability to rent property as a
conforming use did not provide the basis for variance.
The stiffest case so far as setting up the restrictions
on variances in the case of Brackett v. Boston Board of
Appeal, 311 Mass. 52 (1942). The facts are rather ex-
tensive and go this way. A hotel in a residence district
was having trouble finding parking space for its guests.
They purchased a vacant lot across the street which was
also in a residence zone but restricted by private deed
to single family use. It was also the last lot in the
residence zone. The court over-turned the decision of
the Board of Appeal, ruling that there was not sufficient
hardship. They pointed out among other things that the
hardship, the need for parking facilities, applied to the
hotel lot, not the one in question. They put themselves
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clearly on record so far as lots on borderlines between
zones are concerned by the following statement.
"In any scheme of zoning it would seem that
the establishment of boundary lines may
impose some hardship on premises on that
side of the line where the conditions as to
use are more onerous, but if this results
in a general burden upon the premises so
situated, the question whether there shall
be a change in the boundary lines is not
for the board of appeal to determine."
This case is a startling one for the strictness of the
view they have taken, and hardly seems to follow from
the general idea of the Norcross Case of 16 years
earlier. There it may be recalled one of the major
factors was the nearness of the less restricted zone,
not even a problem of being adjacent. It would be
interesting to contemplate what the court would have
said if the applicant in the Brackett case had not
been the hotel but another. It would appear that the
court failed to see things about this case which it
has seen in others. It would seem that a good hard-
ship case might be made out on the following basis.
The lot involved was vacant unlike almost
all the others nearby. It was subject to a deed
restriction limiting construction to single houses and
under changed economic conditions it was not possible
to make any use of the property as zoned since no one
would consider building a single residence in that area
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at the time. There was a clear benefit to be obtained
by the community by providing a parking space even if
limited to the use of the patrons of one organization.
The benefit would even extend to the other houses in
the residential zone. The probable results of such an
action would have been to raise values in that part of
town. Further the matter was not the subject of a zone
change since the result would not be accomplished by a
change to business since that would only serve to
aggravate the parking difficulty in the general area.
It seems then that the court has finally come
to a very stiff position in regard to variances as
regards hardship, but has attained that position on the
basis of a set of facts that should have produced a
different result. As we progress to the actual cases
decided in Cambridge and Concord we will see that the
actual attitude of a board is much more lenient. The
cases in Cambridge were all decided after the decision
in the Brackett Case. The striking thing about a great
proportion of the hardship cases is that the hardship
is one of business rather than land. The board will
constantly grant a variance where the hardship has no
relation to the lot involved.
Trying to set forth a group of cases to show
what has been considered hardship is very difficult
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from the cases available in the records. A few obvious
ones do appear such as the cases where the sale of land
is concerned. Cases have been mentioned in our discussion
of special conditions which are justas relevant here.
For example there was the case where the man wanted to
divide his land and three existing dwellings into three
land parcels. Clearly we could say that it would be a
hardship to require that these three houses should always
be sold together. Similarly when a lot was divided be-
fore the ordinance in an area let us say 10% less than
the area required by the ordinance, we should not today
say that a man cannot use his earlier investment. If we
did refuse his appeal we would be putting a distress
value on his land and he would stand a great loss.
The repercussions from the impact of an ord-
inance upon a lot and house that existed before the
ordinance was passed are not dissimilar from the above
cases. So in the instance where the appellant wanted to
build a garage in the front yard due to the lot and lay-
out it would be a hardship if the owner was required to
walk a long distance to a public garage. The rental on
the public garage would be not the only or prime
motivation of hardship, but would be combined with the
necessity of going for the car, which necessity would
not be faced by other houses in the zoning district.
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Another case involved the need of adding on to a garage
to make it large enough to house a modern car. The
only other alternative was to rip out the back end of
the garage and add on at the expense of considerable
space inside the house when the invasion of the side
yard and violation of the ordinance may have totaled
4 feet.
A somewhat closer problem arises when it is
desired to divide a large lot into two one of which may
not conform to the ordinance for either frontage or area,
but may be excessive in the other, while the main lot is
excessive in both. These cases have been approved and
again it seems to be a hardship that the lot always
remain in one ownership when the divergence is so small.
Yet the hardship is hard to define. The hardship would
seem to be that the land would be frozen in a size of
lot which is unwise today, and the subdivision in ac-
cord with the ordinance would produce an absurd shape
of lot and thereby complicate the matter of ownership.
There are numerous other cases along the
general line of the above which seem to involve the
same general type of hardship, a hardship of not being
able to use the land as others in the same district can
use it.
Another big group of cases where the hardship
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is quite substantial are those involving the expansion
of non-conforming uses. Where a business is expanding
through the normal efforts of management it would be
a very great hardship if it were tied down to its size
when the ordinance was passed. The results are of
course monetary, but there are difficulties of manage-
ment which are a bit different. There remain three
alternatives to a business in this position, to remain
in cramped quarters, to set up a subsidiary plant, or
to set up a wholly new operation, all of which are
difficult processes. There then seems to be little
doubt that in many instances when a non-conforming
use outgrows itself that we would find real instances
of hardship. The situation is such that efforts have
been made to cover this specially in the Cambridge
ordinance by making it a special exception with very
precise limits. The problem is a very real one and
some way must be found to meet it for the method tried
in Cambridge does not seem from the record to have been
successful. For the moment we will say that this type
of case should not be treated as a matter of hardship.
Certain special cases arose as a result of
the war and the peace which would not have arisen in
other times. During the war when building was at a
standstill, many small manufacturers were badly crowded
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for space. Also due to the shortage of goods for sale
there were many vacant stores. It became quite common
for this type of concern to try to operate part of
their business in a retail store. Often this occurred
without consent of the building inspector and cases
arose on complaints from neighbors. There seems to be
little question that under normal processes there was no
right of variance. The mere inability to rent a store
due to there being too many certainly does not constitute
sufficient hardship to allow the introduction of industry.
The war conditions being as they were the granting of a
variance was probably wise for in relation to other
aspects of the variance power to be mentioned later,
the hardship was probably sufficient.
To continue the picture of hardship we will
try to describe some cases which do not involve hard-
ship, many of which were approved. Often a man has ac-
quired a house in a residential district for his own
use as a home and then immediately requested a variance
to use it as a funeral parlor. His sole hardship is
that he has bought a house too big to live in and he
wants to use it in part for business. There is often
nothing to prevent it being used economically within
the limits of the ordinance, but there is more profit in
it the other way.
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There is a standing pressure on the part of
apartment builders to cut down the size of the side
yards provided in the ordinance. Out of four or five
such cases, in only one was it possible for the
appellantto show even half way decently that it was
physically impossible for him to build a reasonable
apartment on his lot within the limits prescribed. In
the other cases the sole desire was to get more dwelling
units on the land purchased and so to increase the profit.
The board of appeals should not allow itself to become
the means whereby a buyer can pay too much for land ex-
pecting to get a variance. So also there is no reason
why the board should become an insurance agancy to cover
the poor estimates of real estate operators. A compar-
able type of request is that urging that a builder be
able to go above the available height limit. The
reasons for such a request are no better as a general
rule.
Parking spaces are always causing some trouble
in a city as crowded as Cambridge. As the ordinance
stands now they are allowed only in Business B districts.
Requests have come from random types of property owners
all wanting to use some vacant land for this purpose.
In every case the complaint was based largely on the
hardship of a nature related to an adjoining business
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rather than the land itself. In one instance the owner
admitted he wanted to keep the land open pending the
building of a permanent structure. Another found that
he could not satisfactorily make use of his house as
a rooming house as he had planned so desired to sell it
to a nearby store. In another case an elderly lady
thought it would assist her income and payment of taxes.
There is a marked tendency to approve parking space
cases regardless of reason. Only one seems to have been
refused.
The further repetition of so-called hardship
cases will not clear the matter up particularly. It
is all too clear that the Cambridge board is consider-
ing some sort of convenience, not substantial hardship.
The Concord board seems in its few cases to have
followed a bit clearer line. In one instance the latter
group did find hardship in the fact that a lot was ad-
jacent to a business zone and permitted the construction
of a doctors office which in appearance looks like a
house. There seems to be some good reason to allow some
such latitude in the board in spite of the wording of
the Brackett Case.
At the end of Section 2 of this chapter we
stated what seemed to be a more specific definition of
the term Special Conditions as given in the statute.
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To follow it with an adaquate definition of hardship,
more than that, substantial hardship, does not come
easily. We note from our previous paragraphs that
the courts and actual boards have not found the answer.
We find results that indicate that the thought involved
means inability to- use the land in the most profitable
manner. Another case tends toward the idea that it
would be inconvenient. The Cambridge ordinance has
said that the granting of the variance must be essential
to the enjoyment of a substantial property right, and
yet the Cambridge board seems to have taken an entirely
too liberal meaning of this phrase. Do we then find
that the hardship need only be that it is impractical or
difficult to use the property in the manner for which it
is zoned, noting especially that this difficulty must
come as a result of special conditions as defined above?
It seems that it is this relationship which would serve
best to circumscribe the actions of the board. We
therefore propose the following more complete wording
of the phrase:
Hardship is difficulty or inconvenience,
resulting from special conditions. To be
substantial the special conditions must
result in the inability to make use of the
land as zoned, but it cannot be the result
solely of a past, present or future value.
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4. What is Detriment to the Public GoodT
This phrase offers us little more assistance
than the term hardship. The courts have found little
occasion to discourse on the subject. They have,
however, mentioned it as well as its oonverse, the
conferring of a benefit to the community. The matter
is so broad in its aspects that we can go but briefly
into it here.
In the Hammond case the court recognized the
fact that the neighborhood was in need of new stores
avione may conclude that they there had the idea that
the store would confer a benefit to the public good.
The other side of the matter came under review in the
MarinelliCase where the court stated that there would
be no detriment to the public good in that the coal
pocket there involved would not be any more detrimental
than the railroad yard already in existance. Like the
Hammond Case the decision in the Amero Case recognized
that there would be a benefit conferred upon the
community if the filling station involved were able to
sell two kinds of gasoline. Unfortunately the court
did not feel greatly persuaded in their review of the
Brackett Case by the clear benefit t4 the public good
in the provision of off street parking under the facts
of that case. It would seem that the benefit here
conferred should have weighed more heavily.
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Both the Cambridge and Concord Boards have
found occasion to notice the matter of detriment to the
public good, or its opposite benefit to the public good.
Concord has seen fit to decide that a garage can be
built within the side yard limits where in fact it can-
not be seen by the adjoining landowner due to the
position of the latters garage and the location of the
petitioner's garage many feet from the street. It was
also obvious that the addition of a new chimney to an
old house which would encroach 8 inches into the side
yard would be no detriment to the public good. It was
decided that where a man wanted to move a non-conforming
barn to another non-conforming position on his lot, but
where the latter one was much better, would be no harm
to the public good. Where a man wanted to build a
porch which would have cut off the light and air of
his neighbors the board had no hesitation in refusing
the appeal. A final case in Concord involved a lot in
a residence zone adjacent to a business zone. The
board there allowed the construction of a building for
doctor's offices. Here was a clear instance of confer-
ring a benefit since it provided a center for medical
activities in the town which would provide better
service.
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There are 98 cases in Cambridge which in-
volve the matter of detriment to the public good to a
certain extent but in nowhere near all of them is the
matter discussed in the records of the hearings.
Certain appeals were granted because there was clearly
no detriment to the public good.
The cases which have been mentioned before
involving the subdivision of lots and existing houses,
the invasion of side and rear yards with garages were
allowed easily because garages so located were common to
the city before the passage of this ordinance. The
board has felt, it would appear from the record, that the
addition to an already non-conforming use would be no
detriment to the public good. One may assume that the
extension of such a use will not be particularly worse
than the existing condition which trend of thought is
sustained by the Marinelli Case. In a couple of
instances there has been a revolt from this policy the
most vigorous being a case that involved the expansion
of a beer trucking station.
This last mentioned case brings up what is
apparently the most relied on determination of detriment
to the public good, namely, how much of a fuss is made
and by how powerful a group. Where the objectors can go
so far as to get the City Council to pass a motion in
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opposition to the variance the ultimate in influence
has been reached. Most cases do not go that far de-
pending more on the individual Councillor from the
district, the local church or even in special cases
such groups as the local historical society. Each has
had its say in special instances.
While th'e importance of such groups is great,
especially when the City Council feels moved to act,
boards should not be fooled by them. Where, for example,
the owner of a lot divided by a zone line wants a
variance to permit the construction of a new part of a
store in the residence part of the lot, the objections
of the local historical society to the change on the
ground that it would injure the historical importance
of the older building on the lot, the board should be
very skeptical. So also the objections of the adjoin-
ing owner to the prospective use, when he had just ob-
tained a considerable variance from the regulations on
his lot should not be worried about too much.
A major factor in this problem should be the
relationship of the proposed project to projects that
are already in existance nearby. As a general rule it
would be hard to say that-the extension of a business
zone and business uses for thirty feet or so beyond the
present zoned business would be any serious detriment
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to the public good. So also the extension of a two
family house over the border into a single residence
zone has no great effect on the public good in and of
itself. These above comments are of course based on
the assumption that special conditions causing sub-
stantial hardship have been shown. From the above it
can be seen that detriment to the public good cannot
be expected to be a strong control where the property
involved lies adjacent to a district line. Above we
have pointed out its weakness when non-conforming uses
are involved. We can, however, assume a detriment
when any lower use tries to invade the center of a
district from which it is excluded, and in that instance
there would seem to be the need of conferring a benefit
upon the community if a variance is to be issued.
We seem then to have come again to a point
where the subject is almost too broad for simple
definition by words. It is of necessity an absolutely
individual matter dependant entirely upon the facts.
If detriment isnot definable in words we need not
necessarily assume that it cannot be the basis for
judicious judgement. To this end we propose a defini-
tion or description of the term that will at least
bring to a focus the matters that should be considered
at a hearing.
-64-
Detriment to the public good is that aspect
of the granting of a variance which tends to
rouse the general disapproval of the public
or neighborhood in a manner that cannot be
specifically classified and the importance
of the aroused opinion should be considered
with great care never allowing such opinion
to outweigh substantial hardship.
5. What is Derogation from the Intent of the Ordinance?
The last limitation on the granting of
variances is that a variance shall not derogate from
the intent of the ordinance or by-law. Fortunately
there is more specific guidance on this matter than
there is on any other of the limitations placed on
variances, for there is a long list of purposes and
intents at the beginning of the statute and most
ordinances or by-laws. Section 25 of Chapter 40 goes
in part as follows:
"Such regulations and restrictions shall be
designed among other purposes to lessen
congestion in the streets; to secure safety
from fire panic and other dangers; to provide
adequate light and air; to prevent the over-
crowding of land; to avoid undue concentration
of population; to facilitate the adequate
provision of transportation, water, sewerage,
schools, parks and other public requirements;
and to increase the amenities of the
municipality."
The City of Cambridge has rephrased these
intents by including at the beginning of their ordi-
nance the following purposes and intents:
"The purposes of this ordinance are to promote
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the general welfare of the City of Cambridge
to protect the health of its inhabitants,
to encourage the most appropriate use of
land within the city, to insure the value of
property, to lessen the congestion in the
streets and ways, to avoid undue concentra-
tion of population, to provide an adequate
supply of light and air by regulation the
location, use, and height of buildings and
the area of open spaces about them, and to
reduce the hazard from fire."
And further:
"In interpreting and applying the provisions
of this ordinance, the requirements contained
herein are declared to be the minimum require-
ments for the purposes set forth."
The town of Concord in its by-law makes no
statement of intent so we may presume that it accepts
the principles set forth in the statute as quoted
above.
In the cases which the matter of variance has
been under review the court in Massachusetts does not
seem to have gone into much detail on this matter of
intent as it affects variances, yet there would seem
to be a great deal of possible material here. Clear-
ly they did not feel that where a benefit in accord
with the intents of the ordinance was to be conferred
by the variance it was a matter of importance. We
refer here to the Brackett case where there would have
been a marked lessening of congestion in the streets
had the variance been allowed. This appears to be
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somewhat in conflict with the willingness to use the
benefit to be conferred in the Amero Case as a means
of partially justifying the variance. While the
statute states that no variance shall be granted where
it would derogate from the intent, the courts have a
slight idea that if it encourages the intent, or
furthers the intent, that a variance should be granted.
While the court has not found it necessary
to make a clear statement of this general idea, it is
clear from the rulings of the boards under review that
the conferring of benefit in accord with the intent of
the law should be an important reason for granting a
variance. We have mentioned before a few cases in
Cambridge were regardless of special conditions caus-
ing hardship it has been found possible to allow park-
ing spaces in restricted districts apparently on the
basis that they would improve conditions in the
community. To the mind of the board it has seemed to
be more beneficial to allow parking in a restricted
area if it is possible than to adhere to the precise
terms of the ordinance. The board has allowed very
weak special conditions, actually nothing more than
the fact the lot was vacant to provide the basis for
conferring the benefit. Using the same approach with
different facts the Concord board allowed a variance
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to allow the construction of a medical office in a
residence district considerably on the basis of the
benefit to be conferred.
These instances where the boards have allow-
ed variances to confer a benefit are far outnumbered by
cases where they have not considered the matter of dero-
gation from the intent of the law at all. While the
intent is to a limited extent set out in the above
quoted sections of the statute and ordinance the actual
body of an ordinance will include many matters which
are an expression of intent, for that matter the whole
ordinance is the mere putting into measurable quantities
of the intents, as specifically set forth in the second
part of the above quotation from the Cambridge Ordinance.
Therefore if the ordinance makes it necessary to have a
side yard of 15 feet in a certain district the allowing
of a reduction to 10 feet is a substantial derogation
from the intent. The same conditions would apply to th e
reductions of ske and rear yards. There would remain
a real distinction between the case of a whole apartment
structure being allowed a variance such as this and a
single garage covering perhaps not more than 20 feet of
yard being allowed such a variance. Instances of both
have been mentioned before in this paper and are merely
cited again at this time in a general way. So also if
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the ordinance states that funeral parlors shall be
allowed in business districts there is a considerable de-
rogation from the intent when they are allowed in a resi-
dence district. Yet the board in Cambridge has seen fit
to allow a couple of such cases to pass, perhaps we may
assume on the idea of conferring a benefit. There can
be no clear justification for allowing a variance as to
use only a matter of months after the legislative body
had made a specific use classification of a specific
parcel of land and yet the board in Cambridge has done
it.
The most serious violation of the intent of
the ordinance as it is written in Cambridge has been in
the matter of non-conforming uses and their expansion
of repair. The ordinance has a clearly stated provision
for the consideration of such case which reads as
follows:
"(the board may) . . . Permit the alteration
or extension of a non-conforming building or
use, provided such building or use is neither
increased in volume nor in area during its
life by more than twenty-five (25) per cent
or is altered during its life to an extent
not exceeding fifty (50) per cent of its
assessed valuation at the time this ordinance
takes effect, and provided such use is not
altered to a less restricted use."
This would seem to be a clear expression of the intent
to hinder the prolongation of the life of non-conforming
uses and yet the board in Cambridge has made almost no
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use of this clause. Reference is not made to it
either by the board or parties since the board simply
handles all cases as variances which is clearly in
error. It seems to us that any granting of a variance
for a non-conforming use is a substantial derogation
from the intent of the law in Cambridge and would re-
quire extreme qualities of hardship to support it.
We note here again that it is a failure to really know
the ordinance that causes the difficulty. If the
Cambridge City Council had meant to allow all non-
conforming uses to continue without limit there would
have been no need for such a clause.
There is another body of the government that
becomes vitally interested in the zoning ordinance when
intent is concerned, and should have some opportunity
to regularly make itself heard, namely the planning
board. In most communities this group will either
have written the ordinance or assisted some special
commission which actually wrote it. In any case it is
considered the custodian of the law and is responsible
for preparing and reviewing changes. If this is the
case their opinion becomes very important in the matter
of variances so far as intent is concerned and their
opinion should have considerable weight. In Concord
the Planning Board almost always either sits in as a
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group on appeals hearings or has a spokesman there.
In Cambridge this is not the case, and it is only with
difficulty that the Planning Board can make itself
heard. There are numerous letters from the latter ex-
pressing their attitude on various matters but the board
of appeal does not seem to take too much interest in
them. Such was the case when a district line passed
thru a lot and resulted in part being in business and
part in residence. Even the statement that it could
not have been the intent of the zoning board to thus
divide an existing business lot did not convince the
board of appeal. Likewise the objections of the Plan-
ning Board to various variances for reduced side yards
have had little or no effect. In the future provision
should be made to inform the Planning Board of all
hearings and decisions along with other interested
parties.
There would seem -to be no particular benefit
in repeating the facts of cases since there is such a
broad field to cover in the matter of intent. The:
cases cited in the previous sections of this chapter
show how every set of facts will have some relationship
to the matter of intent. So also it can be said that
the extent of the derogation often is not given much
consideration. There is a repeatedly marked tendency to
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consider a multitude of generalities without referring
them to the wording of the ordinance.
From the above brief discussion of intent we
must try to draw up a guide in order to better direct
the attention of boards to the consideration of this
matter. We propose the following wording:
In the consideration of a variance, the board
should give due consideration to the intent
of the ordinance by a statement relating to
at least some of the matters of intent as
stated in the law, such as to promote the
general welfare, to protect the health of the
inhabitants, to encourage the most appropriate
use of land, to insure the value of property,
to lessen the congestion in the streets, to
avoid undue concentration of population, to
provide an adaquate supply of light and air,
and to reduce the hazard from fire, and further
should report the opinion of the Planning Board
on the matter where given.
6. The Variance Power as a Whole.
The time has now come to summarize the various
statements that have been offered as guides to the im-
proved operation of boards of appeal. It is our opinion
that the plain repetition of the words of the statute
in an ordinance is not sufficient and that it is better
to substitute some other phraseology amplifying and
detailing the statute which is too broad in scope to be
effective, a phraseology that will include the ideas
that have been developed thru many years of experience
and litigation. We therefore would include in that
-72-
section giving the board its powers the following:
The board shall have the power to grant a
variance when in their opinion there are
with respect to the single parcel of land
with respect to which appeal is taken
special conditions of size, shape, physical
conformation, or the use of it, or the
structures upon it or their use, or the
condition and use of nearby parcels or
structures which produce hardship in the
use of the land as zoned, but not without
giving stated consideration to the amount
of detriment to the public good, as ex-
pressed by the community or parts thereof,
and not without giving stated consideration
to the amount of derogation from the intent
of the ordinance which includes the follow-
ing, to promote the general welfare, to
protect the health, to encourage the most
appropriate use of land, to insure the value
of property, to lessen the congestion in the
streets, to avoid undue concentration of
population, to provide an adequate supply
of light and air, and to reduce the hazard
from fire, and not without giving considera-
tion to the opinion of the planning board on
said appeal.
It must be pointed out that this is but one
of a series of steps that aim at requiring a closer
attention on the part of boards of appeal to the sub-
stance of the law and the facts of the case which
relate to it.
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CHAPTER VIII
CONCLUSION
While we have traversed the field of activity
of boards of appeal and have made several comments con-
cerning what have been more or less details, the time
has come to prepare a corrective program for the main
fault in their operations, namely their failure to
know their job as defined by statute and judicial
interpretation. The first thing to do is to place an
expanded definition of the powers of boards of appeal
in an ordinance or by-law which will better focus
attention on the matter of major importance, the
necessity for special condition where a variance is
under consideration. This may be done in the manner
suggested at the end of Chapter VII above.
If we thus accomplish a better statement of
the law as it applies in each case we must now provide
a means whereby people will become aware of it. We
have noted that the Cambridge board does not seem to
have used parts of the law provided and in the light of
this fact we want everyone involved to become aware of
as much of the law as possible. As things are now,
appeal is made on a simple form and it is probable that
in most cases the appellant only knows that he can appeal
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in the case of hardship. This is inadequate since the
hardship as we have pointed out above is the secondary
aspect of the matter. Existing records indicate that
appeals are purely as a matter of convenience or desire.
If a form of appeal can be developed which will direct
the appellant's attention immediately to the law, many
cases might be dropped before the start and accordingly
more time would be left for the important ones.
Obviously one of the first things to be required of the
appellant should be that he state the type of appeal
that he is making and where he wanted a variance he
should be obliged to state his special conditions. To
this end we propose that the following information should
be required on the Appeal Blank.
1) A statement by the Building Inspector as
to the section of the ordinance to be
violated by the proposed construction.
2) A statement by the appellant that he
appeals under a special section of the
zoning ordinance namely; administrative
error, special exception, or variance.
3) A statement of the reasons for appeal from
an administrative error.
4) A statement of the section number under
which a special exception is requested.
5) Where a variance is requested the appellant
should answer the following questions.
a) What special conditions of size, shape
physical conformation, or use of the
land or the structures upon it, or the
condition and use of nearby parcels or
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structures produce a hardship in
conforming to the Zoning Ordinance.
b) What is the hardship.
And further should state that he is aware
that the board of appeal cannot grant a
variance which would be detrimental to
the public good or derogate from the intent
of the ordinance, which intents should be
restated in full on the appeal form.
While this amount of information may seem a
bit on the heavy side, it is no more than would be re-
quired of the appellant at the hearing later on. By
this means he would be required to think out his case
at the time he appealed and less time would be spent
at the hearing talking over irrelevant matters.
To properly prepare a case for appeal a
party should have some idea of what has happened be-
fore. In spite of the statements that each case is a
different case and should be decided by itself, as the
number of cases increase over the years, facts will
begin to repeat themselves. In certain instances they
have already done so. In order that a sort of case
system may be built up there should be a regular
catalogue kept of all decisions so that reference to
them would be easy. The exact form of such a catalogue
would be dependant on the substance of the local
ordinance, but certain things would naturally be in-
cluded. Among them would be the zone, the use,
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matters of coverage, accessory use, the section of the
ordinance involved and of course which power was in-
volved. Such a catalogue need only have a reference
as to the decision and a reference to the actual case
number. If available to the public through the
building inspector everyone would have a chance to
find out what has happened in similar cases and need-
less appeals would be avoided. Naturally the board
itself would use it to assure at least a reasonable
consistency in its decisions.
The final recommendation stems again from
the same matter of lack of knowledge of the powers
involved in appeals. The return must be improved so
that it is not a mere repetition of the statutory
words but is a judicial document. The courts have had
their say as noted before, but the current results do
not indicate that their opinion has gotten to actual
boards. In the ordinance there must be a clear state-
ment that the return must give the reasons whereby the
board fround special conditions, hardship, lack of
detriment to the public good and derogation from the
intent. This will avoid the policy of giving de-
cisions which are unsupported by facts. So also such
a policy would considerably assist in the developing
of good records and a better understanding of the
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actual processes involved in a zoning appeal.
Throughout this paper there has been but one
main purpose which was to discover the flaws in the
operations of boards of appeal and from that to develop
ways of improving their work where needed. The time
has come to again quote from the decision of the court
in the Prusik case:
"there must be set forth in the record
substantial facts which rightly can
move an impartial mind, acting judicially
to the definite conclusion reached."
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